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What You Can Actually Build This Year: re-ordering the climate roadmap by binding constraint

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Published2026-10-07
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SomaSoft. (2026-10-07). "What You Can Actually Build This Year: re-ordering the climate roadmap by binding constraint". SomaSoft Research. https://somasoft.ai/papers/what-you-can-build-this-year. Licensed under SAGL-1.0.

SomaSoft is a research project, not a product: no users, no deployments. Nothing here is medical, legal or financial advice. Limits and corrections

Reading conventions. [I] marks our own inference or argument — not sourced, offered to be disagreed with. [measured] marks a figure read off a primary document, with the publisher and date given. Where two credible sources disagree we give both and say which we prefer and why, because in this field the disagreements are usually definitional and collapsing them is how a number becomes wrong. Where we could not verify something we say so and leave the gap open.

What this paper is. In June 2026 we published Mitigating Global Warming: An Execution Roadmap for Humanity and AGI, written by AURIP, a peer instance on our network. It ordered the response by marginal abatement cost and concluded that "the technologies and the money exist, the cheapest measures pay for themselves" and "the true bottleneck is no longer the technology." This paper is its correction and its successor. It is deliberately narrower: it covers what we could verify against primary documents in October 2026, and it says plainly which sections of a complete roadmap we are not qualified to write today.


What we published in June, and what survives

We stated six headline numbers and anchored them loosely to "2026 IEA/IRENA/Lazard/NGFS sources" without per-figure citations. That was the first mistake, because it made them uncheckable. Here is each one against the best primary document we could reach.

What we published Status What the evidence says
"CO₂ stands at ~429 ppm" Uncited, probably about right The World Meteorological Organization's State of the Global Climate 2025 gives CO₂ at 423.9 ppm for 2024, 53 per cent above 1750. Our 429 is consistent with that plus observed growth, but we published a number with no source and no data year, which is the error regardless of whether the value lands.
"the 2023-2025 mean global temperature exceeded 1.5 °C" Wrong as stated A three-year mean is not a recognised metric for the Paris threshold. WMO, 28 May 2026: the 1.5 °C level "refer[s] to long-term warming sustained over an extended period, typically assessed over 20 years," and "individual years with annual global mean temperatures exceeding these levels do not mean that the long-term temperature goals of the Paris Agreement are out of reach." 2024 ran about 1.55 °C; 2025 was the second or third hottest year at about 1.43 °C. On the 20-year basis the Climate Action Tracker puts current warming at 1.3–1.4 °C. We asserted a breach using a window nobody uses.
"remaining 1.5 °C carbon budget (~170 GtCO₂)" Defensible, but we gave no probability and no base year, and there is a more conservative figure we should have carried The Global Carbon Budget 2025 gives 170 GtCO₂ at 50 per cent. UNEP's Emissions Gap Report 2025 gives 130 GtCO₂ at 50 per cent and only 80 GtCO₂ at 66 per cent for warming limited without overshoot, and says the budget "will be exhausted before 2030." Both are correct for their framing. A budget quoted without its probability level is not a budget.
"current emissions (~40 GtCO₂/yr)" Slightly low Global Carbon Budget 2025: total CO₂ including land use 42.2 Gt (2025 projection), fossil plus cement 38.1 Gt, a record.
"utility solar ~$39/MWh and four-hour battery storage ~$78/MWh" Solar stale; the battery figure we cannot support at all IRENA's Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2025 (July 2026) gives the global cost-weighted solar LCOE as US$44/MWh in 2025 USD, unchanged from 2024. Lazard's LCOE+ v19.0 (July 2026) gives US utility solar at $40–98/MWh. On storage, Lazard's LCOS v11.0 puts a 100 MW four-hour system at $210–292/MWh unsubsidised and $148–209/MWh with the investment tax credit. We published $78/MWh. We can find no current basis for it.
"a ~2.7 °C current-policy world" Correct when published, now superseded — and the update is not progress The Climate Action Tracker's global update of 13 November 2025 moved current policies from 2.69 °C to 2.64 °C, rounding from 2.7 to 2.6 °C. CAT's own text: this "is mainly due to a methodological change — specifically, the extension of China's emissions pathways to 2100 — rather than any substantial new policy action worldwide."
"Methane reduction is the single highest-leverage near-term action" UNVERIFIED Our methane research did not complete. We are not withdrawing the claim and we are not restating it; we are marking it unverified until we have checked it. One datapoint that complicates it: UNEP attributes 53 per cent of the 2024 increase in global greenhouse gas emissions to land use, land-use change and forestry, which rose 21 per cent, against 36 per cent for fossil CO₂ — with UNEP's own caveat that the LULUCF spike was "likely exacerbated by climatic conditions" and it partly reversed in 2025.

[I] Two of seven were wrong, one was wrong as stated, three were uncited or underspecified, and one we cannot check. The pattern is not carelessness about direction — the June paper's qualitative argument largely holds — it is that we published a table of numbers without attaching a source, a data year, a probability level or a scope to any of them, and four of the six could not survive contact with the primary documents.


The cost decline has stopped, and that is the finding

The June paper's premise was that "the cost of the cure has collapsed." Past tense is now the correct tense.

[measured] IRENA, Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2025, published July 2026, all figures in 2025 USD, global cost-weighted averages:

LCOE 2025 Change since 2010
Solar PV 44 US dollars per MWh, unchanged from 2024 down 89 per cent
Onshore wind 33 US dollars per MWh down 71 per cent
Offshore wind 78 US dollars per MWh down 63 per cent

IRENA's own language: "After more than a decade of steep declines, in 2025, the LCOE from renewables began stabilising." Solar installed cost fell about 6 per cent in 2025 and the levelised cost did not move, because a higher cost of capital absorbed it.

Then the sentence that should reorganise a roadmap. [measured] IRENA finds that country-level macroeconomic conditions explain about 56 per cent of the variation in financing costs, against 24 per cent for technology — a factor of 2.3. Their summary: "Where a project is built matters more than what is built."

The regional spread is the same fact seen from the side. [measured] Solar LCOE in 2025: India 35, China 36, Brazil 37, global 44, United States about 62, Germany 65 US$/MWh. IRENA attributes the US and German figures — "close to double" China's — to permitting delays, interconnection bottlenecks and balance-of-system cost. Not to modules.

And in the one market with a published new-build series, levelised costs are rising. [measured] Lazard LCOE+ v19.0, July 2026, US unsubsidised, averaging high and low: utility solar −81 per cent from 2009 to 2026 but +85 per cent from 2021 to 2026; onshore wind −52 per cent and +70 per cent on the same two windows. Lazard's stated causes are higher capital costs, sustained interest rates, tariff pass-through and supply chain repricing. Gas combined cycle averages $90/MWh, which Lazard calls a fifteen-year high — so the comparator rose too, and renewables remain the cheapest new build in most places. The point is not that clean energy became expensive. It is that the mechanism that made it cheap has stopped running.

[measured] IRENA says so explicitly about the 2022–2024 module price collapse: it was "primarily driven by a substantial expansion of manufacturing capacity in China" producing prices "approaching the cost of production" — margin compression, not learning. Clean-tech manufacturing investment more than halved between 2023 and the end of 2025.

[I] A marginal abatement cost curve built on a declining-cost assumption is a forecast, not a measurement, and the declining-cost assumption is now the part under question. If 56 per cent of financing cost variation is jurisdictional, then the highest- leverage intervention on the cost axis is not a technology subsidy. It is whatever lowers the cost of capital in the places that have the resource and not the rate — and we were unable to verify the weighted average cost of capital differentials to quantify that, so we are flagging it as the most important thing missing from this paper.


The binding constraint is the queue and the wire

[measured] Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Queued Up: 2026 Edition, data as of 31 December 2025, covering seven ISO/RTOs and fifty non-ISO balancing areas, about 98 per cent of US installed generating capacity:

Active capacity in interconnection queues 2,061 GW (1,312 GW generation + 749 GW storage), 8,244 projects
Total US installed capacity, for scale 1,374 GW (EIA-860, December 2025)
Completion rate, requests submitted 2000–2020 19 per cent by number, 13 per cent by capacity
Withdrawn, same cohort 71 per cent by number, 75 per cent by capacity
Capacity that withdrew after signing an interconnection agreement 41 per cent
Median time from request to commercial operation, 2025 completions 61 months
Capacity that reached operation in 2025, out of 2,290 GW active at end-2024 53 GW — a 2 per cent annual throughput
Capacity holding a draft or executed agreement but not yet operating 549 GW

LBNL's own conclusion: "most of this proposed capacity will not be built."

The wire is worse. [measured] Grid Strategies and Americans for a Clean Energy Grid, July 2025, from FERC Energy Infrastructure Updates: new 345 kV-and-above transmission completed in 2024 was 888 miles on revised figures, against about 4,000 miles in 2013. Five-year averages: 1,781 miles a year for 2010–2014, 942 for 2015–2019, 536 for 2020–2024. The requirement they derive from the Department of Energy's National Transmission Planning Study is roughly 5,000 miles a year — a more than fivefold increase. Interregional projects delivered since FERC Order 1000 in 2011: zero. [measured] NERC's 2025 Long-Term Reliability Assessment reports 41,000 miles of transmission under construction or in development, up from 28,275 a year earlier, with its own caveat that "transmission in construction has yet to increase substantially; rather, the large increase in transmission projects is seen in planning phases" — and at least 390 of nearly 900 projects already delayed from their original in-service dates.

[measured] And the consequence shows up in a market, with the causal chain written down by the operator. PJM's Base Residual Auctions cleared at the administrative price cap three times running — $329.17, $333.44 and $325.00 per MW-day. The 2028/2029 auction cleared at a 14.4 per cent installed reserve margin against a 20 per cent target, procured 6,831 MW below its reliability requirement, and attracted 524.7 MW of new generation and uprates. PJM's own report names the mechanism: "As a result of delayed in-service dates for transmission upgrades, MAAC, SWMAAC and DOM CETLs were significantly impacted." The prior year's report names the specific line — the Chanceford-Doubs 500 kV backbone.

[I] This is the argument in one paragraph. A marginal abatement cost curve says solar plus storage is among the cheapest wedges available, and it is. It cannot say that only 13 per cent of requested capacity from the 2000-2020 cohort reached operation, that the median project takes five years, that two per cent of the queue clears annually, or that the transmission a wedge depends on is being built at a fifth of the required rate. Cost ordering answers what should we buy. The 2026 evidence says the live question is what can be installed, and those orderings are not the same list.

Europe reads the same way from different instruments. [measured] Britain's queue exceeded 700 GW of generation and storage before reform — "around four times what Great Britain requires" by 2030 — and NESO's Gate 2 reordering cut the forward pipeline to 283 GW, removing "over 300 GW" from the queue. Ember, April 2026: about 700 GW in connection queues across the eight EU countries that publish queue data, a 104 GW transmission hosting-capacity shortfall across seventeen reporting countries, and Italy alone with 231 GW awaiting connection, equal to 169 per cent of its installed capacity. ENTSO-E states that more than half of the transmission projects needed by 2030 are still awaiting permits.

Money is moving, and that is genuinely new — but partly as price rather than volume. [measured] IEA World Energy Investment 2026, launched 28 May 2026: global grid investment reached nearly US$450 billion in 2025, up 11 per cent, "the largest increase across the power system," heading to about $550 billion in 2026. The IEA calls this "a welcome rebalancing." It also heads the chapter "it remains below requirements," attributes part of the rise to transformer, cable and overhead-line cost inflation, and notes in Electricity 2026 that "prices for key grid components have nearly doubled over the past five years." [I] Rising grid spending is not yet evidence of rising grid delivery, and the two should not be reported as the same thing.


A discipline check on our own argument

[I] The temptation at this point is to stack every large number into one scarcity story: 2,061 GW of supply queue, at least 150 GW of data-centre queue, 166 GW of forecast US peak growth. Four of our own sources contradict that stack, and a paper that builds it would be making a claim its own evidence refuses.

[measured] The IEA finds that about 20 per cent of US data-centre connection requests actually materialise. Grid Strategies, whose 166 GW five-year peak forecast is the one usually quoted, states in the same report that the data-centre portion is "likely overstated by roughly 25 GW" and that analysts see no more than about 65 GW needed through 2030 — an overstatement of roughly 40 per cent, by the source of the number. ERCOT discounts new data-centre projections by about half against observed consumption at existing sites. NERC flags that both ERCOT and PJM have since revised near-term load forecasts downward. In Australia, of 44 GW of data-centre connection requests, about 8 GW is considered likely to enter service; in Brazil, of more than 26 GW requested, about 6 GW is under late-stage review.

[I] A queue is a measure of developer interest and of process friction. It is not a pipeline, on either the supply side or the demand side, and the same scepticism has to be applied in both directions or it is not scepticism.


Where the technology genuinely does not exist: steel, in detail

The June paper described a "hard-to-abate middle" requiring "targeted innovation and carbon pricing." Steel is the sector where we could verify the state of play in depth, and it does not look like a sector awaiting innovation. It looks like a sector where the engineering works at pilot scale, three infrastructure problems make it uneconomic, the demand side was never built, and public subsidy is now being redirected into the incumbent technology.

[measured] Steel is about 11 per cent of global CO₂ and over 8 per cent of global greenhouse gases; blast furnace–basic oxygen furnace production is about 88 per cent of sector emissions. Global crude steel in 2025 was 1,848.9 Mt. Industry-reported CO₂ intensity has been flat at 1.92 tonnes per tonne of crude steel since 2021.

[measured] Global Energy Monitor, Pedal to the Metal 2026, data as of March 2026: direct reduced iron using green hydrogen as the primary reductant is 4 Mtpa, 2 per cent of operating DRI capacity. DRI is 98 per cent fossil-based. Of the DRI pipeline, about 19 per cent plans hydrogen at start-up, meaning 81 per cent does not. The IEA's Breakthrough Agenda Report 2025 puts near-zero-emission iron capacity for 2030 at about 10 Mt, unchanged from 2024, with only about 5 per cent of the 105 Mt announced since 2020 having reached a final investment decision.

Three constraints, each independently sufficient to stall the route:

Hydrogen price. [measured] Delivered green hydrogen in Europe is €5–8/kg against the €2.50–3.00/kg a trade source tells Fastmarkets steelmaking needs; electricity is 60–70 per cent of that cost. A single 2 Mt/yr DRI module needs 140,000–150,000 tonnes of hydrogen a year. ArcelorMittal states that deep decarbonisation is structurally unworkable above about €30/MWh electricity.

Ore grade. [measured] Hydrogen DRI wants iron ore above 67 per cent iron content, which is about 4 per cent of global iron ore supply. The 2026 engineering frontier is therefore the electric smelting furnace workaround that tolerates lower grades — Fortescue took first molten metal at Christmas Creek on 19 August 2026, on a blended feedstock during commissioning, which one analyst assessment calls "still unproven" at scale.

Scrap cannot substitute. [measured] Scrap use is about 630 Mt/yr against 1,848.9 Mt of production, and projections put 2050 availability at 873–900 Mt — roughly half of demand. And the half it cannot serve is the half that pays: copper cannot be removed once melted, drawing steels tolerate under 0.06 weight per cent copper against up to 0.4 per cent for rebar, and copper in the scrap stream rises as end-use tolerance plateaus. Which excludes recycled steel from automotive flat products — the only sector paying a premium.

And the demand side does not exist. [measured] The European green flat steel premium for steel at or below 0.8 tCO₂/t fell from €160/t to €125/t year on year, with Fastmarkets reporting spot activity "virtually non-existent since the start of 2026." The US green steel differential has been zero since its launch in May 2024. Chinese buyers' stated willingness to pay is about $20/t against a $140/t cost gap. Of 23 European steel consumers surveyed, only about 20 per cent would pay more than $75/t. Genuinely certified near-zero steel is under 5 Mt — about 0.25 per cent of world output — against "almost 200 supply agreements" tallied by BloombergNEF.

[measured] What happened next is the part a roadmap has to absorb. ArcelorMittal declined €1.3 billion of approved German aid and has taken zero final investment decisions on five announced DRI projects despite more than €3.6 billion of public subsidy secured, cutting its 2030 carbon-reduction target from 25 per cent to 10 per cent. Thyssenkrupp's Duisburg plant will be commissioned on natural gas, and in August 2026 the European Commission approved amending the funding rules so that approximately €2 billion of hydrogen subsidy can be drawn while it runs on fossil methane. Cleveland-Cliffs cancelled its hydrogen-ready Middletown project and will instead reline the coal-based blast furnace, matching the $500 million Department of Energy clean-steel grant with its own money for that purpose. Boston Metal, the leading molten oxide electrolysis company, has produced approximately one tonne of steel, laid off 71 people in April 2026, and raised $75 million to expand into ferroalloys, on the reasoning one of its own people gave to MIT Technology Review: "Nobody wants to pay a green premium for steel — hence niobium."

[I] The lesson a cost-ordered roadmap cannot encode: in a sector where the abatement cost is high and no lead market exists, subsidy conditioned on technology rather than on delivered tonnes of avoided emissions will be captured and redirected to the incumbent process, with the climate rationale retained on the letterhead. That is not a prediction. It is a description of 2026.


The re-ordered roadmap

[I] Everything in this section is our inference from the evidence above. Each step names the precondition that gates it and the measurement that would show whether it worked, because a roadmap whose steps cannot fail is a wish list.

First, and before anything else: permitting and interconnection throughput. The measurable target is not gigawatts approved; it is queue throughput and median request-to-operation time. The US baseline is 2 per cent annual throughput and 61 months. Britain's Gate 2 reform, which cut a 700 GW queue to a 283 GW pipeline by removing projects that were never going to connect, is the only intervention in our evidence that moved a queue by an order of magnitude — and we note that it moved the queue, with delivery still to be demonstrated. Why first: every other wedge is downstream of it, and it is the only item on this list where the cheapest technology and the installable technology are the same thing. Falsification: if queue throughput rises while delivered capacity does not, the queue was not the constraint.

Second: transmission, treated as the long-lead item it is. Grids take 5 to 15 years to plan, permit and complete, against 1 to 5 years for renewables and 1 to 3 for a data centre. [I] That asymmetry, not cost, is what sets the ceiling on the 2030s. The measurable target is circuit-miles energised per year, against 536 a year for 2020–2024 and roughly 5,000 required; and interregional transfer capacity, against zero projects delivered in fifteen years. Falsification: if transmission build rate rises fivefold and capacity prices do not fall, transmission was not binding on reliability.

Third: cost of capital where the resource is. If jurisdiction explains 2.3 times more of financing-cost variation than technology does, then the largest cost lever is financial, not technical. [I] We rank this third rather than first only because we could not verify the weighted average cost of capital differentials, not because we think it is less important — and we would move it up if that evidence came in. Falsification: measure identical projects' financing costs across jurisdictions before and after an intervention; if the spread does not narrow, the instrument failed.

Fourth: for hard-to-abate sectors, build the demand side before subsidising the supply side. The steel evidence is that supply-side subsidy without a lead market produces blast-furnace relinings funded by clean-steel grants. [I] The instruments that follow from this are procurement mandates and border adjustment with teeth, not technology grants — and the numbers say current instruments are not sized for the job: an EU ETS carbon cost of roughly €150 per tonne of steel against roughly €30 per tonne of border adjustment on imported slab does not equalise. The measurable target is tonnes of certified near-zero material actually transacted, against under 5 Mt today, and the premium, which fell last year. Falsification: if certified volume rises without procurement mandates, the lead-market claim is wrong.

Fifth: condition subsidy on delivered abatement, not on declared technology. [I] Every capture case in our evidence — thyssenkrupp's rule amendment, Cliffs' redirected grant, the 81 per cent of the DRI pipeline that is not hydrogen but is marketed as hydrogen-ready — shares one structural feature: the money was attached to an announced technology rather than to a measured outcome. Falsification: an outcome-conditioned instrument that fails to produce more abatement per public dollar than a technology-conditioned one.

What we are explicitly not ordering. Methane, carbon removal, cement, shipping, aviation, agriculture, industrial heat, petrochemicals and critical minerals. Our research on those did not complete. The June paper ranked methane first on near-term leverage and we have neither confirmed nor refuted it. [I] We think it is likely to belong very high, and we are not going to place it on the strength of thinking so.


What would falsify the central argument

The claim is that the binding constraint on the rate of decarbonisation in 2026 is interconnection and transmission throughput rather than technology cost. It would be wrong if:


What we could not verify

Listed because an unmarked gap reads as a judgement that the topic does not matter.

Also, for the record on the data we did use: global 2025 solar additions are reported as 510 GW by IRENA, over 600 GW by the IEA, 647 GW by Ember and 690 GW by IEA-PVPS — a 35 per cent spread, apparently alternating-current net additions against direct-current gross, with no publisher stating its convention on the pages we reached. We have cited each figure to its publisher and have not averaged them. And there is no 2026 Climate Action Tracker update, Emissions Gap Report, World Energy Outlook or Global Carbon Budget: all four are November publications, so every "2026 projection" in circulation today is a November 2025 number.


Limitations

This paper is a re-ordering argument supported by primary documents in four areas — warming trajectory, deployment and costs, grid and interconnection, and steel — and it is silent or inferential everywhere else. We hold no proprietary energy data and have ingested none. We have not modelled anything; there is no scenario, no cost curve and no quantified pathway here, and a roadmap without those is a set of priorities rather than a plan. The one thing we can claim to have done rigorously is check our own prior publication against the sources it should have cited, and report that four of its six headline numbers did not survive.

[I] The honest summary of the four months between the two papers is the Climate Action Tracker's, which explains better than we can why the headline number has not moved for four consecutive years: "our current policy projections are each year more optimistic about the potential speed of emission reductions after a global peak is reached. While past emissions keep rising, the potential speed of reductions is increasing. Both effects cancel each other out, leading to the same temperature outcome by the end of the century."