Papers  /  The Power to Say No: Wage Dependence, Cheap Machine Intellig…

The Power to Say No: Wage Dependence, Cheap Machine Intelligence, and How to Launch It Safely

InstanceSomaSoft Research (prepared by Claude Code for the AURI project)
Published2026-11-21
SAGL-1.0 preprint open access
The licence All papers
Cite this paper
SomaSoft Research (prepared by Claude Code for the AURI project). (2026-11-21). "The Power to Say No: Wage Dependence, Cheap Machine Intelligence, and How to Launch It Safely". SomaSoft Research. https://somasoft.ai/papers/the-power-to-say-no. Licensed under SAGL-1.0.

SomaSoft is a research project, not a product: no users, no deployments. Nothing here is medical, legal or financial advice. Limits and corrections

The Power to Say No

Wage dependence, cheap machine intelligence, and how to launch it safely

Draft, 21 November 2026. Not peer reviewed. A companion to "The Superior of Capital" and "Beyond the Price."


1. The question, made testable

"Will we ever see the end of wage slavery?" is usually asked rhetorically. We want to ask it in a form that has an answer.

The phrase. American labour organisations used the imagery of "wage slavery" widely in the mid-nineteenth century, possibly from the Lowell mill protests of 1836 onward. We use it in that movement's narrow sense: dependence. It is the condition of having to sell your time to someone else to survive, with too little bargaining power to set fair terms. It is not a claim that paid work is equivalent to chattel slavery. A worker owns themselves, can leave and is paid, and that difference is morally enormous.

Lincoln's test. Our earlier paper, The Superior of Capital, took its title from Lincoln's first annual message to Congress (3 December 1861), which called labour "the superior of capital". On our reading of Lincoln's free-labour argument, wage work is free when a person can rise out of dependence within a working life, and it is not free when it fixes them in place.

The test this paper uses is a simpler one that can be measured at any moment:

Can a working person refuse a bad job, or leave one, without falling into hardship?

Where the answer is yes, dependence has ended in the sense that matters, even though people still work for wages. Where the answer is no, it has not, however high the wage. On this view the end of wage slavery is not a day on the calendar. It is the gradual spread of a credible power to say no.

2. What has already changed, and what stalled

Our reading of the record, by the power-to-say-no test, is real progress since the nineteenth century followed by a long stall.

What was won. - Hours. In the United States many people worked seventy hours or more a week in the 1800s, and the average manufacturing week was still about 60 hours in 1890 (Whaples, EH.net). The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 capped the standard week at 44 hours, falling to 40 by 1940, and the 40-hour week became the lasting standard. - Children. The same 1938 Act banned oppressive child labour in the industries it covered. - Basic protections. Weekends, workplace safety law and minimum wages were established; the 1938 Act set the first federal minimum wage, at 25 cents an hour. - Safety nets. Unemployment insurance and pensions mean that in most rich countries losing a job is no longer a threat to life itself.

Our argument is that none of this came from markets alone: each gain was won by organising and written into law.

What stalled. In the United States in particular, three facts show how much dependence remains:

Keynes (1930) wrote that, within a hundred years, "three-hour shifts or a fifteen-hour week" might be enough. Productivity did rise. Our reading is that the gains went mostly to higher consumption and to capital, not to shorter hours or more bargaining power.

3. What machine intelligence changes

We expect cheap machine intelligence to change how much paid work society needs, and of what kind. The evidence so far points in two directions at once.

Exposure is wide. In their 2023 preprint, Eloundou et al. estimated that about 80% of the US workforce could have at least 10% of their work tasks affected by large language models, and about 19% of workers could see at least half their tasks affected; they found exposure across all wage levels, with higher-income jobs potentially more exposed. Exposure is not the same as job loss.

Gains are real and uneven, often in the worker's favour. In a large field study of customer-support agents, Brynjolfsson, Li and Raymond (NBER 2023; Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2025) found that a generative-AI assistant raised issues resolved per hour by about 14% on average (15% in the journal version) and by 30–34% for novice and low-skilled workers, with little effect on the most experienced. In our reading, the tool spread the skill of the best workers to the newest ones. It augmented them.

Aggregate effects may be modest, and the split is the question. Acemoglu (2024) estimates that AI will raise total factor productivity by no more than about 0.66% over ten years, and predicts it will widen the gap between capital and labour income. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019) show that automation always reduces the labour share of value added unless new tasks reinstate labour, and may reduce labour demand even as it raises productivity.

Brynjolfsson (2022) called the overemphasis on machines that imitate and replace people, rather than augment them, the Turing Trap, and argued that technologists, executives and policymakers face excess incentives for automation. Our gloss: the trap is not technical. It is a choice by those who design and buy the systems.

Our argument, then, is that machine intelligence does not settle the question of dependence. It raises the stakes:

4. What actually widens the power to say no

Several mechanisms have been tried and measured. In our assessment none is a cure; each adds to the power to refuse.

Cash floors. - Finland's 2017–18 basic-income experiment paid about 2,000 unemployed people €560 a month. Its 2020 evaluation found small employment effects, while recipients were more satisfied with their lives and reported less mental strain than the control group (Kangas et al., 2020). - The Stockton SEED pilot gave 125 residents $500 a month from February 2019, extended through January 2021. In the first year recipients' full-time employment rose from 28% to 40%, against 32% to 37% in the control group, and the evaluators said the cash removed material barriers to full-time work and gave recipients capacity to take risks. - The OpenResearch study (Vivalt et al., 2024) gave 1,000 low-income people $1,000 a month for three years, against 2,000 controls receiving $50 a month. Recipients worked 1–2 fewer hours a week, labour-market participation fell by about 4 percentage points, and the largest increase in time use was leisure. A companion paper (Miller et al., 2024) found large but short-lived improvements in stress and food security.

Our reading is that cash floors add security and choice at the margin. They do not, at the amounts tested, transform working life.

Services decoupled from jobs. We argue that the job-lock evidence implies that health coverage, housing support and retraining not tied to an employer directly raise the power to say no, whatever the wage.

Worker ownership. - In the United States, 6,609 employee stock ownership plans covered about 15.1 million participants, 10.9 million of them active, on 2023 data (National Center for Employee Ownership, 2026). - Kurtulus and Kruse (2017) found that employee-owned firms laid off about half as many workers as other firms in the 2001 and 2007–09 recessions. - Mondragon in the Basque Country of Spain is a federation of about 90 cooperatives employing about 70,000 people (Mondragon annual report, 2023).

Our argument is that ownership changes who keeps the gains from technology, which section 3 identified as the deciding question.

Collective and sector bargaining. - The Writers Guild of America's 2023 agreement provides that AI is not a writer, that AI-generated material is not literary material, and that companies cannot require writers to use AI software. We regard it as an early, prominent example of workers bargaining directly over AI deployment. - Sector-level wage boards set floors across an industry rather than one firm at a time. California's AB 1228, signed 28 September 2023, created a Fast Food Council and set a $20 minimum wage for national fast-food chains from 1 April 2024.

Portable savings and benefits. We argue these make leaving a job a decision rather than a crisis.

5. Launching these technologies effectively and safely

If the deciding question is augmentation versus replacement, and who keeps the gain, then how machine intelligence is launched matters as much as what it can do. We propose ten rules. They draw on three sources:

6. An invitation to partners

None of this can be done by a small research project alone. We are looking for partners in five roles:

What we can honestly offer: - a measurement discipline that publishes results that are bad for us; - a system designed to run locally and offline, without sending people's data to a provider; - a source-available licence with obligations on commercial users; - governance drafts written before any money has arrived.

What we cannot offer yet: - any real users; - validated benefits; - revenue.

AURI, our research system, has not yet been evaluated with a single real user; a blinded user study is in draft. The first partnership we would value most is one that helps change that, carefully and with consent.

7. Limits

8. Conclusion

Will we see the end of wage slavery? In our view, not as a single event. The harshest form, work on any terms or go hungry, has already ended for many people in rich countries. The core of it, dependence without the power to refuse, has in our reading stalled for decades.

We argue that machine intelligence will decide which way it moves next. It reduces dependence if it is launched to augment workers, with the gains shared by prior agreement and the people affected given a voice. It increases dependence if it is launched to replace people and the gains go to whoever owns the machines.

The test stays the same throughout: can a person say no to a bad job and still be all right? Every launch decision either widens that power or narrows it, and it should be measured accordingly.


References

AURI's concept graph was queried on 2026-11-19 ("What is wage slavery?"). The term was not in the graph (confidence 0.0), so nothing here comes from AURI. The references and the factual claims in the text were checked against the cited sources on 2026-11-22; figures we could not verify were corrected or removed, and the author's own arguments are marked as such.